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Is the Court of Indian Offenses of Ute Mountain Ute Agency a Federal
Agency for Purposes of the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause?

CASE AT A GLANCE
This case, which examines the application of the U.S. Constitution’s Double Jeopardy
Clause, sits within the intersection of tribal courts, federal Indian law, and federal criminal
law and jurisdiction. Essentially, the question is whether a Native American Indian can be
punished twice for the same conduct—first in tribal court and a second time in federal court.



Denezpi v. United States
Docket No. 20-7622
Argument Date: February 22, 2022 From: The Tenth Circuit
by Barbara Creel
University of New Mexico School of Law, Albuquerque, NM

Introduction

Major Crimes Act. That statute provides “[a]ny Indian
who commits” certain enumerated offenses “against
the person or property of another Indian or any other
person” “shall be subject to the same law and penalties as
all other persons committing any of the above offenses,
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.” 18
U.S.C. § 1153. State courts generally have no jurisdiction
to try Indians for conduct committed in “Indian country”
unless Congress says that they do. Negonsott v. Samuels,
507 U.S. 99 (1993).

There are 574 federally recognized Indian tribes listed by
the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) that possess a formal
nation-to-nation relationship with the United States
government. Notice, 87 Fed. Reg. 4636-02 (Jan. 28, 2022).
Some, but not all of these tribes, operate tribal criminal
courts. Scholars and the courts generally use the term
tribal courts to encompass tribal courts created by tribal
tradition; courts created under a tribal constitution; and
Courts of Indian Offenses. Courts of Indian Offenses are
defined as “the courts established pursuant to” 25 C.F.R.
Part 11, 25 U.S.C. 3602(2); such courts are also known as
“CFR courts.”

Thus, federal and tribal courts have concurrent
jurisdiction over “major” or serious crimes committed
in Indian country, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, unless the federal
government has delegated that authority to a state
government, 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C. § 1321 (Public
Law 280). Tribal courts exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over nonmajor crimes when the victim is Native
American, 18 U.S.C. § 1152, and over victimless crimes,
U.S. v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602 (1916); contra U.S. v. Sosseur,
181 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1950). After Chief Justice William
Rehnquist’s decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish, tribal
courts have no power to prosecute or punish non-Indians.
435 U.S. 191 (1978). With this sketch of criminal

Criminal jurisdiction in Indian country is complex.
See McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020). Tribal
criminal jurisdiction over Native American Indian
offenders is inherent and exclusive, limited only by federal
statute. Ex parte Kan-gi-shun-ca, 109 U.S. 556 (1883). This
jurisdiction extends to Native American offenders whether
or not they are enrolled citizens of the tribe in which they
are being prosecuted. U.S. v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
Federal criminal jurisdiction within “the Indian country,”
is necessarily limited and proscribed by the Indian
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jurisdiction in Indian country in mind, it becomes clear
that the answer to the double jeopardy question raised in
this case will apply only to Native Americans.

On July 17, 2017, Denezpi and V.Y. traveled together from
Teec Nos Pos, Arizona (Navajo—T’iis Názbąs, meaning
“round tree”), near the Four Corners area, to Towaoc,
Colorado. Once they arrived, V.Y. spent some time at the
Ute Mountain Casino. She then accompanied Denezpi to
a home located within the Ute Mountain Ute Reservation.
Denezpi is accused of forcing V.Y. to have nonconsensual
sex while inside the home, barricading the front door, and
threatening V.Y. The next morning, while Denezpi was
still asleep, V.Y. walked back to the casino, where she was
arrested for public intoxication and on an outstanding
warrant. She then reported the assault to a BIA officer.
Denezpi asserted that the sexual encounter was consensual,
whereas V.Y. asserted it was not.

The tribe in this case, the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe,
operates a court system through a Court of Indian
Offenses (CFR Court), an entity established by the BIA
under the Code of Federal Regulations. The CFR Court
enforces both the Ute Mountain Ute Code and the Code
of Federal Regulations (CFR). The issue lies in whether
the CFR Court is a tribal entity or a federal entity. If the
CFR Court is a federal instrumentality, then there are not
two separate sovereigns—jeopardy attaches with the first
conviction and the Double Jeopardy Clause would prohibit
the second prosecution. If the CFR Court is a tribal entity
deriving its power from inherent tribal sovereignty, then
the dual-sovereignty doctrine would apply, and the second
prosecution in federal court would not be barred by the
Double Jeopardy Clause.

Following a short investigation, BIA Special Agent Lyle
Benally swore out a criminal complaint in the CFR
Court for the Ute Mountain Ute Agency. Denezpi was
charged with assault and battery, in violation of the Ute
Mountain Tribal Code, and with false imprisonment and
making terroristic threats, in violation of the Code of
Federal Regulations. See 25 C.F.R. § 11.402 and § 11.404.
The caption appearing on all CFR Court documents was
The United States of America v. Merle Denezpi. Denezpi
requested a jury trial and remained in custody on a $5,000
cash-only bond, pending the CFR Court proceeding.

Notably, the U.S. Constitution does not apply to tribal
governments, as the tribes predate both the United
States and its Constitution. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S.
376 (1896). Instead, the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA)
applies a modified version of the Bill of Rights to tribal
governmental actions, which includes a double jeopardy
prohibition. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(3).

On December 6, 2017, the tribal case resolved when
Denezpi entered an Alford plea to the assault and battery
charge, and the remaining two charges were dismissed
with prejudice. The Alford plea is so called based on the
holding of North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), in
which the Supreme Court sanctioned pleas by which “[a]n
individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly,
and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison
sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his
participation in the acts constituting the crime” because
he “intelligently concludes that his interests require entry
of a guilty plea and the record before the judge contains
strong evidence of actual guilt.” The CFR Court accepted
the plea and sentenced Denezpi to 140 days incarceration,
representing his time-served in the BIA Chief Ignacio
Federal Detention Center. He was released from custody
on that charge on December 6, 2017.

Issue

Is the Court of Indian Offenses of Ute Mountain Ute
Agency a federal agency, barring Denezpi’s prosecution
by both the CFR Court and the federal district court as
violative of the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause?

Facts

The petitioner in this case, Merle Denezpi, is an enrolled
member of the Navajo Nation. The respondent is the
United States. The Ute Mountain Ute Tribe is not a party
but joined in an amicus brief.
On June 7, 2018, Denezpi was indicted and charged
with aggravated sexual abuse in Indian country in
a single count indictment. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a)
(1)–(2) and 1153(a). The indictment was based upon
an alleged sexual assault of another Native American
Indian, V.Y., which occurred on the Ute Mountain Ute
Reservation a year earlier. Both the alleged victim and
the defendant are Navajo. The case was prosecuted in the
Ute Mountain CFR Court because the incident occurred
within the exterior boundaries of the Ute Mountain Ute
Reservation.
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Six months later, on June 7, 2018, Denezpi was indicted in
the federal district court for the District of Colorado on
one count of aggravated sexual abuse in Indian country,
based upon the same incident that occurred on the
Mountain Ute Reservation investigated and prosecuted by
the CFR Court.
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Case Analysis

Denezpi moved to dismiss the federal indictment on
double jeopardy grounds, arguing that Denezpi had already
been prosecuted by the federal government through the
CFR Court. He argued that the subsequent prosecution by
the federal government was “an impermissible and illegal
violation of Denezpi’s double jeopardy rights as envisioned
in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”
The United States District Court for the District of
Colorado denied the motion, stating that “the CFR
Courts’ power to punish crimes occurring on tribal lands
derives from their original sovereignty, not from a grant of
authority by the federal government.” U.S. v. Denezpi, No.
18-cr-00267, 2019 WL 295670, at *3 (D. Colo. Jan. 23, 2019).
The court explained that, under the “dual sovereignty
doctrine,” “‘a single act gives rise to distinct offenses—and
thus may subject a person to successive prosecutions—if it
violates the laws of separate sovereigns.’” (quoting Puerto
Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 579 U.S. 59 (2016).)

Double Jeopardy

The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no person
shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const. Amend. V. Whether
this protection is afforded to Native American Indians
previously prosecuted by an Indian tribal government is
the question in this case, but the heart of the matter is the
nature of the CFR Court in question and the “ultimate
source” of its power.
In U.S. v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978), the Supreme Court
upheld the subsequent conviction of a Navajo man in
federal court after his conviction and punishment in Navajo
tribal court for the same offense. The Court recognized that
tribes possessed inherent sovereign powers, including the
power to “prescribe laws for their members and to punish
infractions of those laws.” Because this power is inherent,
rather than delegated by the federal government, the
Wheeler Court determined that the exercise of that power
is part of the tribe’s retained sovereignty and “not as an arm
of the Federal Government.” Therefore, the prosecution
by a tribal court and federal court of charges arising from
the same set of events was an exercise by dual sovereigns
that did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Wheeler
left open the question of whether CFR Courts were to be
treated in the same manner as tribal courts for the purposes
of Double Jeopardy.

Denezpi was found guilty after a jury trial. The trial court
imposed a sentence of 360 months (30 years) in prison
followed by 10 years supervised upon his release—“a
sentence almost 80 times longer” than his first sentence.
Denezpi appealed the district court’s denial of his motion
to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit noted that the parties
agreed the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe had “the inherent
power to prosecute criminal offenses committed by
an Indian on its sovereign lands and that the source of
this power is the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe’s ‘pre-existing
sovereignty.’” They departed on the source from which
the CFR Court derives its power to prosecute crimes in
Indian country. In other words, whether the CFR Court’s
power to punish came from the federal government
or its own wellspring of inherent sovereignty. Denezpi
argues that the ultimate source is federal power rather
than tribal sovereignty, based upon the nature of the CFR
Court as evidenced by its origins and current structure
within the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs agency. He
argues that since its inception, the CFR Court has been
a federal instrumentality. “He therefore contends that
his prosecution by both the CFR Court and the federal
district court violated the Fifth Amendment’s Double
Jeopardy Clause.”

The United States’ position follows Wheeler closely,
asserting that Denezpi’s prosecution in the Court of Indian
Offenses does not bar his prosecution in a subsequent
federal district court for the federal-law offense of
aggravated sexual abuse. The government takes the
position that the CFR Court is a tribunal exercising the
powers of a Native American tribe, arguing that the dualsovereignty doctrine permits the subsequent prosecution.
Citing to a recent case, the United States provides,
“[f]or nearly two centuries, this Court has consistently
recognized that a single act that violates two sovereign’s
laws comprises two distinct ‘offences’ and that the Double
Jeopardy Clause accordingly permits two prosecutions.”
(quoting Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960 (2019).)
Both parties recognize that had he been tried for his
tribal-law offense in a tribally operated court, Denezpi’s
subsequent federal prosecution would be permissible
under Wheeler. Where they differ is whether the Ute
Mountain Ute Tribe is operating as a separate sovereign
because the Tribe utilizes the Court of Indian Offenses

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision, and Denezpi
petitioned for Supreme Court review. The Court granted
certiorari on October 18, 2021. The case is scheduled for
oral argument on Tuesday, February 22, 2022.
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as the forum for prosecuting violations on tribal lands.
Denezpi argues that the dual-sovereignty doctrine
does not apply because the CFR Court is a federal
instrumentality.

of state jurisdiction, but where Tribal courts have not
been established to fully exercise that jurisdiction.”
Currently, there are five CFR Courts across the
United States, which serve 15 tribes, and the Santa
Fe Indian School, which occupies Indian trust lands.
See https://www.bia.gov/CFRCourts.

Are Courts of Indian Offenses (CFR Courts)
Tribal Sovereign Courts?

The Ute Mountain Ute Tribe is one such tribe that has
maintained its relationship with the CFR Court that
serves them. The BIA continues to supervise the court,
appoints the prosecutor, and runs the jail located on the
reservation. The Code of Federal Regulations sets out
due process requirements for CFR Courts and affords
individuals an appointed counsel, 25 CFR § 11.303(c), even
though the ICRA does not require it for sentences less
than one year, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(6). The government
argues that this is immaterial because the Ute Mountain
Tribe has chosen the CFR Court to “exercise [the] tribes’
sovereign authority.” Essentially, the CFR Court is the
chosen mechanism or machinery for criminal jurisdiction.
It is a sovereign choice.

The CFR Courts arose in the late 19th century as a tool of
assimilation. The commissioner of Indian Affairs to the
secretary of the interior described the CFR courts in this
manner:
Since 1882, what is known as a “court of Indian
offenses” has been established and maintained
upon a number of Indian reservations. It has been
a tentative and somewhat crude attempt to break
up superstitious practices, brutalizing dances,
plural marriages and kindred evils, and to provide
an Indian tribunal which, under the guidance
of the agent, could take cognizance of crimes,
misdemeanors and disputes among Indians, and
by which they could be taught to respect law and
obtain some rudimentary knowledge of legal
processes. Notwithstanding their imperfections
and primitive character these so-called Courts have
been a great benefit to the Indians and of material
assistance to the agents. (Colliflower v. Garland, 342
F.2d 369 (1965))

Herein lies the weakness of the Tribe’s and United
States’ argument. The Ute Mountain Ute Tribe has the
sovereign authority to determine how it exercises criminal
jurisdiction. It chose to utilize the CFR Court system,
as opposed to its own traditional justice system, like the
Navajo Nation Tribal Court in Wheeler or its own unique
expression of the adversary system.

At their start, the CFR Courts used codes developed by
the BIA, and tribal member judges were appointed by an
Indian agent.

Dual Sovereignty Doctrine as Applied to State/
Federal Concerns

The dual-sovereignty doctrine provides a carve-out to the
ordinary rule against double jeopardy. According to that
doctrine, successive prosecutions of a single defendant by
separate sovereigns, even to punish “identical criminal
conduct through equivalent criminal laws,” are not
prosecutions for the “same offense” within the meaning of
the Double Jeopardy Clause. Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle,
579 U.S. 59 (2016). If there are two separate sovereigns,
then there are two separate harms, and each is entitled to
exercise the sovereign right to punish.

In 1888, the Ninth Circuit decision in United States v.
Clapox provided this contemporary view.
These “courts of Indian offenses” are not the
constitutional courts provided for in section 1, art.
3, Const., …but mere educational and disciplinary
instrumentalities, by which the government of
the United States is endeavoring to improve and
elevate the condition of these dependent tribes to
whom it sustains the relation of guardian. In fact,
the reservation itself is in the nature of a school,
and the Indians are gathered there, under the
charge of an agent, for the purpose of acquiring the
habits, ideas, and aspirations which distinguish the
civilized from the uncivilized man. (35 F. 575 (1888))

Dual Sovereignty Doctrine as Applied to Tribal/
Federal Concerns

In United States v. Wheeler, the Supreme Court applied
the dual sovereignty doctrine to hold that a tribal-court
prosecution for a tribal offense does not bar a federal
prosecution for a federal offense, because tribes are
separate sovereigns whose “right to punish crimes
occurring on tribal lands derives from the tribes’

According to the BIA website, “Courts of Indian
Offences [sic] (CFR Courts) operate where Tribes retain
jurisdiction over American Indians that is exclusive
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases

10

© 2022 American Bar Association

‘primeval sovereignty’ * * * ‘and is attributable in no
way to any delegation to them of federal authority.’”
There, the Court explicitly declined to address whether
the same logic applies to a prosecution in the Court of
Indian Offenses.

the U.S. Constitution apply to the Native American
prosecuted in federal court under the Major Crimes Act
after his conviction and sentence in this particular type
of tribal court—the Code of Federal Regulations Court.
To answer the question, the Supreme Court must look
to the origins of the BIA Court of Indian Offenses, and
finally determine their status in the framework of federal
judiciary or tribal/federal Indian law.

In its amicus brief, the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe argues
in support of the United States that, because CFR Courts
derive their power to prosecute crimes from the tribe’s
inherent sovereignty, rather than that of the federal
government, they are dual sovereigns not subject to
the Fifth Amendment prohibition on Double Jeopardy.
In support of this assertion, the Tribe describes the
government’s role in the CFR Courts as “providing the
machinery,” while the tribe provides most of the staff,
controls decision-making, and, most importantly, enforces
tribal laws. However, the Tribe spends less time examining
the prominent role the federal government plays in the
prosecutorial role of the CFR Courts. Unless expressed
otherwise in contract, the tribal prosecutor is appointed by
the BIA—a federal agency. 25 CFR § 11.204.

As set forth above, CFR Courts are not Article III courts.
The CFR Courts have their origins in settler-colonialism
as “disciplinary instrumentalities” to civilize the Indian.
“Currently the CFR Courts are the tribal criminal justice
system of choice by a little more than a dozen of the 574
federally recognized Indian tribes.” The opinion will
impact Denezpi to determine whether his 30-year sentence
under the Indian Major Crimes Act will stand. It will also
determine the Court’s view of the CFR Courts within the
federal/tribal jurisdictional scheme and their authority
within it.
Ultimately, the decision will determine whether Native
Americans will remain the only persons who can be twice
punished based upon their race and political status.

The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, as
amicus, describes some of the “machinery” in place within
a CFR Court:

Barbara Creel is the Karelitz Professor of Law at the
University of New Mexico School of Law and the former
director of the Southwest Indian Law Clinic. She served
as an Assistant Federal Public Defender in the District
of Oregon and is an expert in criminal law defense in
Indian country. She was a contributing author to the 2005
revision of the Felix S. Cohen Handbook of Federal Indian
Law and frequently serves as amicus in Indian country
cases. In 2021, she was an ABA Spirit of Excellence Award
recipient. She can be reached at creel@law.unm.edu.

The federal government can unilaterally establish
a CFR Court, but the tribe cannot unilaterally
terminate it. (Petr’s Br. at 24) Prosecutions are
brought in the name of the United States. (Petr’s
Br. at 25) The federal government implements
any sentence meted out and collects any fine
imposed. (Id.) The federal government pays for the
defendant’s counsel in CFR Court if he is indigent,
25 C.F.R. § 11.309(c)(2), just as it does for defendants
in federal district court, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a). In
short, the federal government is deeply involved
on all three sides of the triangle—the judge, the
prosecutor, and defense counsel are all on the
payroll of the federal government, all arguing from
or applying federal law. (12)
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ATTORNEYS FOR THE PARTIES
For Petitioner Merle Denezpi (Michael B. Kimberly,
202.756.8000, and Theresa M. Duncan, 505.710.6586)

Significance

For Respondent United States (Elizabeth B. Prelogar,
Solicitor General, 202.514.2217)

This case presents the Court with an opportunity
to resolve the question left unanswered in Wheeler:
“whether [a CFR Court] is an arm of the Federal
Government or, like the Navajo Tribal Court, derives its
powers from the inherent sovereignty of the tribe.” Thus,
the case is the first to provide a constitutional analysis of
whether the double jeopardy protections afforded under

PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases

AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of Petitioner Merle Denezpi
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
(Keith J. Hilzendeger, Assistant Federal Public
Defender, 602.382.2700)
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In Support of Respondent United States
Colorado, Nebraska, Nevada, and Utah (Eric R. Olson,
Solicitor General, 720.508.6000)
Federal Indian Law Scholars and Historians (Ian Heath
Gershengorn, 202.639.6000)
Former United States Attorneys John C. Anderson, et
al. (R. Trent Shores, 918.595.4800)
National Indigenous Women’s Resource Center and
the National Congress of American Indians (Mary
Kathryn Nagle, 202.407.0591)
Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, Eastern Shawnee Tribe of
Oklahoma, and Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians
(Jennifer H. Weddle, 303.572.6500)
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